Leveling the Playing Field—Balancing Student-Athletes\u27 Short- and Long-Term Financial Interests with Educational Institutions\u27 Interests in Avoiding NCAA Sanctions by Soederbaum, J. G. Joakim
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 1 Fall Article 9
Leveling the Playing Field—Balancing Student-
Athletes' Short- and Long-Term Financial Interests
with Educational Institutions' Interests in Avoiding
NCAA Sanctions
J. G. Joakim Soederbaum
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
J. G. Joakim Soederbaum, Leveling the Playing Field—Balancing Student-Athletes' Short- and Long-Term Financial Interests with
Educational Institutions' Interests in Avoiding NCAA Sanctions, 24 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 261 (2013)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol24/iss1/9
SOEDERBAUM COMMENT FORMATTED FINAL 2/3/2014 11:00 AM 
 
COMMENTS 
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD—
BALANCING STUDENT-ATHLETES’ SHORT- 
AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL INTERESTS 
WITH EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS’ 
INTERESTS IN AVOIDING NCAA 
SANCTIONS∗ 
J. G. JOAKIM SOEDERBAUM∗∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Johnny Manziel, the 2012 Heisman Trophy winner—who is also known as 
“Johnny Football”—generated $37 million in media exposure for Texas A&M 
during his first year of playing, so far injury-free, but also per National 
Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) regulations, profit-free.1  In 
contrast, with only nine minutes left of a game, Alabama junior wide receiver 
Tyrone Prothro, who had already caught seven balls for 134 yards and made 
 
∗ This Comment won the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School's 
2013 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition. 
∗∗ Third-year student at Texas A&M University School of Law and Editor-in-Chief of the Texas 
A&M Law Review.  The Author would like to thank Professor of Law Frank Snyder for many 
thought-provoking and inspiring conversations; Patricia J. Askew, staff attorney to Justice Bob 
McCoy at the Court of Appeals, Second District of Texas, Fort Worth, for providing invaluable 
feedback and perspective; fellow Texas A&M law students Jessica Theriot and Andrew Middleton for 
proofreading; and the members of the National Sports Law Institute and the Marquette Sports Law 
Review for this opportunity and honor. 
1. Study: End of Football Season Produced $37 Million in Media Exposure for Texas A&M, 
AGGIEATHLETICS.COM (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.aggieathletics.com/ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=6 
32660&SPID=93232&DB_LANG=C&DB_OEM_ID=27300&ATCLID=206020080 [hereinafter 
Study].  At the time this Comment was selected for publication, Johnny Manziel was not yet eligible 
to declare for the NFL draft; however, on January 8, 2014, he announced, “After long discussions 
with my family, friends, teammates, and coaches, I have decided to make myself available for the 
2014 NFL Draft.  The decision was not an easy one.”  Chase Goodbread, Johnny Manziel Announces 
Decision to Enter 2014 NFL Draft, NFL.COM (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000 
000310869/article/johnny-manziel-announces-decision-to-enter-2014-nfl-draft; Billy Liucci, To the 
12th Man: A Personal Message from Johnny Manziel, TEXAGS (Jan. 8, 2014), http://texags.com/ 
Stories/12609; see infra, Parts II.C.1, III.B.2.  Despite Manziel’s decision, his story—as used in this 
Comment—highlights many of the current regulatory shortcomings that must be addressed. 
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two touchdowns, snapped two bones when a defender crashed into him,2 
resulting in his fall from the Heisman watch list, several surgeries, two years 
of rehabilitation, and no reasonable hope of returning as a professional football 
player.3 
Manziel, Prothro, and other student-athletes are at the mercy of strict 
NCAA regulations that favor the NCAA and its member institutions, even 
though developed to protect both the institutions and the student-athletes.4  
The present system’s focus on “amateurism” is poorly designed to protect all 
of the parties involved when a student-athlete’s expectations of a future sports 
career can vanish in the blink of an eye—or the snap of a bone—with no real 
recourse.  While no rules can completely prevent horrific injuries, some 
fundamental changes to current legislation and regulations would provide 
student-athletes a fair opportunity to make their own decisions about their 
careers and capitalize on their successes while they are physically capable of 
doing so and, at the same time, protect universities facing heavy NCAA 
sanctions as a result of violations, as well as prevent needless litigation. 
This Comment will argue that a few changes can vastly improve the 
student-athletes’ precarious situation while also protecting the educational 
institutions that are subject to the NCAA’s sanctions in a straightforward four-
part solution: (1) a student-athlete should not forfeit his or her amateur status 
until actually entering into an agreement with, or receiving benefits from, a 
professional team; (2) the professional leagues should lift any restrictions 
preventing student-athletes from signing with a professional team; (3) the 
legislation governing a student-athlete’s transition from college to professional 
sports should directly include the professional team; and (4) the legislation 
 
2. Clay Travis, Tyrone Prothro, Former Alabama Star Turned Bank Teller, AOLNEWS.COM 
(Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/09/30/five-years-later-ex-alabama-star-tyrone-pro 
thro-is-cashing-chec/. 
3. Jason Galloway, Prothro Still Believes, CRIMSON WHITE (Sept. 30, 2010), http://cw.ua.edu/ 
2010/09/30/prothro-still-believes/; Travis, supra note 2; see also infra Part II.D. (discussing the 
already limited chance for a college player to reach the professional leagues).  Five years later, the 
twenty-six-year-old former college football star-turned-bank teller still hoped to play football again, 
however unlikely that dream might be.  See Galloway, supra. 
4. Richard Salgado, A Fiduciary Duty to Teach Those Who Don’t Want to Learn: The Potentially 
Dangerous Oxymoron of “College Sports,” 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 135, 147–48 
(2007); see also W.J. TAUZIN, COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 1, at 1–2 
(2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1016, 1017; Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of 
the UAAA and SPARTA: How America Should Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True 
Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 172–74 (2013); Lloyd Zane Remick & 
Christopher Joseph Cabott, Keeping out the Little Guy: An Older Contract Advisor’s Concern, a 
Younger Contract Advisor’s Lament, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (2005); Diane Sudia & Rob 
Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes and the Uniform Athlete 
Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 279 (2001). 
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should impose a duty upon the professional team to report to the educational 
institution when one of the institution’s athletes, or his or her representative, 
communicates with the team.  Collectively, these changes would create a more 
balanced system that fosters compliance and, consequently, decreases the need 
for enforcement and the often-resulting litigation.5 
II.  MAIN PARTIES 
On December 28, 1905, sixty-two educational institutions formed the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) to “protect 
young people from the dangerous and exploitive athletics practices of the 
time.”6  In 1910, the IAAUS became the NCAA.7  As intercollegiate sports 
grew more popular, the NCAA, in 1948, established guidelines for recruiting 
and financial aid8 and later developed restrictions on student-athletes and 
educational institutions9 before it transformed into the multi-billion dollar 
franchise that exists today.10 
In contrast to the development of student leagues on university campuses, 
characterized by voluntary, unpaid participation, professional sports ultimately 
became characterized by the payment of athletes for performance11 and their 
 
5. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
6. History: Pre-1950, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About 
+the+NCAA/History (last updated August 13, 2012).  The first intercollegiate football game took 
place in 1869 between Rutgers and Princeton.  Early football, circa 1869, differed vastly from today’s 
football: due to the game’s physical character and minimal protective equipment, players suffered 
“wrenched spinal cords, crushed skulls and broken ribs that pierced their hearts.”  Christopher Klein, 
How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, HIST. HEADLINES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.history.com/ 
news/how-teddy-roosevelt-saved-football; Dan Jenkins, The First 100 Years, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
Sept. 15, 1969, at 46, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG11466 
46/index.htm.  In 1904, there were eighteen recorded football deaths and 159 serious injuries, 
followed by 19 deaths and 137 serious injuries in 1905.  Klein, supra. 
7. History: Pre-1950, supra note 6. 
8. Chronology of Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, http://archive.is/Ea1B (last updated Mar. 21, 2011).  
The NCAA had a “high standard of personal honor, eligibility and fair play” and a strong 
commitment to amateurism.  Id.  Originally allowing the member institutions to be self-regulatory 
created a conflict of interest and, in 1948, the NCAA adopted the “Sanity Code,” which strictly 
regulated financial aid, recruiting, academic standards, institutional control, and amateurism.  Id.  The 
Sanity Code was repealed in 1951 due to concerns with the limits on financial aid, recruiting, and the 
severe consequences for violations.  Id.  In 1952, the NCAA adopted a new code, which then kept 
developing into the 2000s.  Id. 
9. History Pre-1950, supra note 6. 
10. See infra Parts II.A.–B.; Chris Smith, College Football’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES 
(Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2011/12/22/college-footballs-most-valuable-
teams/. 
11. Compare Chronology of Enforcement, supra note 8 (emphasizing the “pure” amateur 
characteristics of collegiate sports), with Peter Morris, From First Baseman to Primo Basso: The Odd 
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concomitant need for representation by agents in negotiating with team 
owners.12  As collegiate and professional sports grew, the primary parties 
relevant to student-athletes’ transition between the two became the NCAA, the 
NCAA member institution, the agent, and sometimes a legal team.13 
A.  The National Collegiate Athletic Association 
As a private organization, the NCAA has authority to regulate only its 
member institutions and its student-athletes.14  The NCAA’s stated goal and 
fundamental purpose is to make a clear distinction between professional sports 
and intercollegiate sports by enforcing the “amateur” nature of intercollegiate 
sports.15  The NCAA oversees eighty-nine national championships covering 
 
Saga of the Original Pirate King (Tra La!), 15 NINE: J. BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE, 46, 48 (2007) 
(explaining how money soon became a regular part of professional sports).  In 1859, the Excelsior 
Club of Brooklyn paid baseball pitcher James “Jim” Creighton, one of the first professional athletes in 
America, $500 per year to sign with the team.  Morris, supra, at 48; Early Baseball Milestones: 
1860.7, MLB.COM: BASEBALL MEMORY LAB, http://mlb.mlb.com/memorylab/chronology/index.jsp? 
start=1826&end=1870 (last updated Mar. 12, 2012).  Other teams soon followed Excelsior’s example, 
and players wanted their share of the money team owners made from the games.  Bob Liff, New Field 
and New Dreams Borough Has Rich Tradition, NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2000), http://www.ny 
dailynews.com/archives/boroughs/new-field-new-dreams-borough-rich-tradition-article-1.883241.  In 
1869, the Cincinnati Red Stockings was the first team to openly admit that it paid all of its players.  
Id. 
12. See Edelman, supra note 4, at 151–52.  The first recorded case of outside representation dates 
back to 1925, when Charles Pyle, representing football running back Harold “Red” Grange, 
negotiated a contract with the Chicago Bears worth close to $10,000 per game—plus a potential 
bonus based on an increase in the Bears’ game attendance.  Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, 
Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-
Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 344 n.26 (2010).  Not until 
the late 1960s, when the players gained leverage by unionizing and increased complexity to 
collectively negotiated agreements, did the role of the agent rapidly grow in importance.  Symposium: 
The Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 345, 355 (2003) [hereinafter 
Symposium]. 
13. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 368.  Of course, other parties, such as state and federal 
government and professional player associations, coaches, alumni, and supporting booster clubs, may 
have individual and more attenuated interests in the regulation of student-athletes, but this Comment 
will focus solely on the parties directly involved in a college athlete taking the step from collegiate 
athletics to professional sports.  See Damon Moore, Proposals for Reform to Agent Regulations, 59 
DRAKE L. REV. 517, 526–28 (2011); Symposium, supra note 12, at 368. 
14. Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unintended 
Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 806–07 (2006) [hereinafter Davis, Regulating the 
Athlete-Agent Industry]. 
15. See 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 1.2–1.3 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] 
(“Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be 
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be 
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”).  Although each of the 
three available NCAA divisions “creates its own rules governing personnel, amateurism, recruiting, 
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twenty-three sports and governs more than 430,000 student-athletes competing 
in three divisions at more than 1,000 colleges and universities.16 
While allowing student-athletes to negotiate with professional teams,17 the 
NCAA has implemented regulations that render student-athletes ineligible for 
future participation in intercollegiate play after agreeing to be represented by 
an athletic agent or accepting gifts from an agent, based on the notion that 
doing so would violate its principle of amateurism.18  Ultimately, the NCAA 
regulations render student-athletes ineligible if they accept benefits from 
“[a]ny person who represents any individual in the marketing of his or her 
athletics ability . . . or [a]n agent, even if the agent has indicated that he or she 
has no interest in representing the student-athlete . . . .”19  Underlying the 
regulations is the presumption that any benefits received by student-athletes 
are based on athletic ability and therefore unavailable to the general student 
body.20 
To identify the limits to paying student-athletes that are necessary for the 
college sports model to succeed, the NCAA defines “pay” as “the receipt of 
funds, awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the 
Association for participation in athletics.”21  The NCAA may also render “a 
student-athlete ineligible if the [student-athlete’s] family or friends accept 
benefits from the agent.”22  The regulations also allow the NCAA to impose 
severe penalties on its member institutions for playing an ineligible athlete, 
including vacated wins and revenue forfeitures.23 
 
eligibility, benefits, financial aid, and playing and practice seasons – consistent with the overall 
governing principles of the Association,” this Comment focuses on the NCAA’s overall governing 
principle of amateurism and how it is portrayed in Division I.  About the NCAA, NCAA.ORG, http:// 
www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Membership+NEW (last updated 
Aug. 13, 2012). 
16. About the NCAA, supra note 15. 
17. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.2.4.3 (“[T]he individual, his or her legal 
guardians or the institution’s professional sports counseling panel may enter into negotiations with a 
professional sports organization without the loss of the individual’s amateur status.”). 
18. Sudia & Remis, supra note 4, at 268–69; R. Alexander Payne, Note, Rebuilding the Prevent 
Defense: Why Unethical Agents Continue to Score and What Can Be Done to Change the Game, 13 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 657, 662 (2011).  The NCAA renders ineligible a student-athlete who 
“ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his 
or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1. 
19. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1.2. 
20. See id. art. 12.3.1.2(a). 
21. Id. art. 12.02.7. 
22. Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry, supra note 14, at 806. 
23. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.1, 19.9.5–19.9.8.  In 2010, the NCAA imposed 
postseason bans, vacated wins, scholarship reductions, revenue forfeitures, and probation on the 
University of Southern California following then student-athletes Reggie Bush and O.J. Mayo 
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The scope of the regulations is broad: all agent contracts presumably apply 
to all sports in which a student-athlete participates and therefore cause a loss 
of remaining eligibility in all of those sports unless otherwise clearly stated in 
the contract.24  The regulations also cover agreements regarding future 
representation, including by lawyers with regard to contract negotiations.25  
An exception to the rule allows student-athletes to retain an advisor to the 
extent that the advisor does not in any form represent the student-athlete in, or 
is present during, the negotiations.26  These regulations create a situation in 
which student-athletes and their guardians may interact and even negotiate 
with professional teams on their own without risk losing any remaining 
eligibility, but without any professional guidance during the actual 
negotiations.27  The regulations also allow NCAA member institutions to 
establish a professional sports counseling panel to aid student-athletes by 
providing traditional agent functions, and NCAA head coaches may perform 
many of the same services as long as the coach follows the NCAA’s reporting 
requirements and receives no compensation from an agent for the services.28 
The NCAA’s approach to defining amateurism does not address the core 
issue, “which is to identify the limits to paying student-athletes that are 
necessary for the college sports model to succeed.”29  The “college sports 
 
interactions with athlete agents.  Payne, supra note 18, at 659. 
24. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1. 
25. See id. art. 12.3.1.1. 
26. Id. art. 12.3.2 (allowing student-athletes to secure advice from a lawyer concerning a 
proposed professional contract, provided that the lawyer does not actually represent the student-
athlete in the negotiations); id. art. 12.3.2.1 (having a lawyer present during the discussion of a 
contract offer with a professional sports organization is considered agent representation). 
27. Id. art. 12.3.2; Payne, supra note 18, at 663. 
28. NCAA MANUAL, supra, note 15, art. 11.1.3.1, 12.3.4. 
29. Jon Solomon, Expert Report in Ed O'Bannon Lawsuit Argues NCAA Members Engage in 
'Price Collusion,’ AL.COM (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/10/expert_report 
_in_ed_obannon_la.html [hereinafter Solomon, Expert Report in Ed O'Bannon Lawsuit] (quoting 
Stanford University economics professor emeritus Robert Noll); see also NCAA MANUAL, supra 
note 15, art. 1.3 (“A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an 
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by 
so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports.”).  In September 2013, Electronic Arts Sports and Collegiate Licensing Company settled all 
claims over the use of college athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, but the remaining defendant, 
the NCAA, announced that it was not interested in a compromise and would not hesitate to fight the 
matter all the way to the United States Supreme Court to defend its product.  See Jon Solomon, EA 
Sports and CLC Settle Lawsuit by Ed O’Bannon Plaintiffs; NCAA Remains as Lone Defendant, 
AL.COM, http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/09/ea_will_not_make_college_footb.html (last 
updated Sept. 28, 2013) (quoting plaintiff’s lead attorney Michael Hausfeld, “The NCAA has never 
made any indication that they are intent on doing anything other than taking their association over the 
cliff if necessary.”). 
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model” requires a player to be a student first and athlete second,30 despite the 
individual physical risks that a student-athlete takes.31  And it appears safe to 
say that the model is broken, at least from the spectator’s perspective.  For 
example, “despite fans knowing Ohio State players violated NCAA rules and 
were playing in the game after receiving impermissible benefits, the Sugar 
Bowl drew twenty-five percent more viewers than the previous year.”32  The 
violations of rules deemed necessary to secure success for the college sports 
model “[did] not appear to have had any effect on the demand for this 
game.”33  In contrast, the strict NCAA definition of amateurism appears to 
restrict student-athletes’ opportunities more than those of regular students and 
declares students entering into agreements with agents ineligible for purposes 
of athletic participation.34  Because the current rules are so strict, many 
student-athletes, particularly those who come from poor economic conditions, 
feel forced to accept or even solicit benefits from agents.35  Additionally, 
several student-athletes have chosen to challenge the NCAA’s strict 
regulations and eligibility requirements in court.36 
B.  The NCAA Member Institution 
Over 1,200 educational institutions hold some form of membership with 
the NCAA, which, as introduced above, places many restrictions on its 
member institutions and their student-athletes.37  Many factors can motivate a 
university to field athletic teams and, consequently, to agree to comply with 
NCAA regulations.  High-visibility athletic programs may increase the 
university’s reputation, and successful athletic programs may increase a 
university’s popularity among applicants, allowing the university to be more 
 
30. Remaining Eligible, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Eligi 
bility/Remaining+Eligible/Amateurism (last updated May 31, 2012) (“In the collegiate model of 
sports, the young men and women competing on the field or court are students first, athletes 
second.”). 
31. See Travis, supra note 2. 
32. Solomon, Expert Report in Ed O'Bannon Lawsuit, supra note 29.  Six Ohio State players 
were found to have violated NCAA rules by selling championship rings, jerseys and trinkets for 
reduced prices on tattoos and money.  The NCAA suspended the players for the start of the 2011 
season rather than immediately for the Sugar Bowl that ended the 2010 season.  Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.1. 
35. Payne, supra note 18, at 687; see also Josh Luchs: States Must Enforce Laws, ESPN, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5681002 (last updated Oct. 13, 2010) (describing how sports 
agent Josh Luchs gave student-athletes money for food). 
36. See infra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
37. See 2008–09 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 4–5 (2009); Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, http://ww 
w.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
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selective in admissions.38  Further, popular and successful athletic programs 
generate significant revenue.39  For example, The University of Texas football 
team ranks as college football’s most valuable team, with a 2011 value of 
$129 million.40  Overall, the twenty highest-ranked teams had an average 
value of $83 million, up from $68 million in 2007.41  The increase is largely 
due to multi-million dollar TV-rights agreements.42 
The NCAA can sanction a member institution through fines, suspensions, 
forfeiture, or restrictions if it finds that the institution has violated NCAA 
regulations.43  However, because the success of a university’s former players 
who became professional athletes may affect its ability to recruit new student-
athletes,44 many universities, rather than isolating their student-athletes from 
agents, have enacted specific guidelines to exert varying degrees of control 
over student-agent contact.45  Such guidelines may consist of requirements 
that an agent provide the university’s compliance office with all materials the 
agent sends to the student-athlete; that the agent schedule meetings with a 
 
38. Moore, supra note 13, at 524. 
39. Id.; see infra notes 167–171 and accompanying text. 
40. Smith, supra note 10.  The University of Texas had a football profit of $71 million for the 
2010 season despite not making a bowl game and, thus, missing out on up to an additional $22.3 
million.  Id.; Chris Greenberg & Chris Spurlock, Bowl Game Payouts Map: Money Earned in 2011–
2012 BCS and Other Football Bowls (INFOGRAPHIC), HUFFPOST SPORTS, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/12/29/bowl-game-payouts-map-2011-2012-bcs_n_1174808.html (last updated Aug. 7, 
2012).  Its football program generated $96 million in revenue.  Smith, supra note 10.  In addition, The 
University of Texas landed a landmark twenty-year deal, worth a total of $300 million, to launch a 
cable channel with Disney-owned ESPN and IMG College.  Id. 
41. Smith, supra note 10.  In 1994, colleges generated $2.5 billion in retail sales of merchandise 
bearing their names, logos, and mascots; and many of the most successful college athletics programs 
entered into multi-million dollar deals with major apparel manufacturers such as Nike and Reebok.  
Timothy Davis, African-American Student Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure?, 
6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 214–15 (1996) [hereinafter Davis, Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory 
Structure]. 
42. Smith, supra note 10.  TV-rights agreements provided an average revenue growth of $6 
million per team over the last two seasons.  Id.  ESPN annually pays $60 million to the Big 12 and 
$10 million to the Big Ten for first-tier TV rights.  Id.  In 2008, CBS and the SEC agreed to a deal 
worth approximately $825 million over fifteen years.  Id.  In 2011, FOX and the Big 12 revealed a 
new thirteen-year cable deal worth $1.17 billion over the length of the agreement.  Id.  Also in 2011, 
the Pac-12 agreed to terms with both ESPN and FOX to establish the richest media rights deal in 
college sports—the contract is worth $225 million per annum for twelve years.  Id.  The NCAA will 
be paid nearly $11 billion over fourteen years just for the TV rights to March Madness.  Ben 
Steverman et al., The Real Cost of March Madness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/consumer-spending/2012-03-21/the-real-cost-of-march-madness.html#slide10.  The NCAA 
then distributes money to its member institutions.  The NCAA Budget: Where the Money Goes, 
NCAA.ORG (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/ncaa-budget-where-money-goes. 
43. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.9. 
44. Moore, supra note 13, at 544. 
45. Id. 
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student-athlete through the head coach; that a member of the student-athlete’s 
coaching staff is present during any meeting; and that agents may meet with 
student-athletes only on certain days or during designated windows during the 
spring semester.46 
C.  Professional Leagues and Agents 
1.  The Professional Leagues 
For purposes of this Comment, the most relevant professional leagues are 
the National Football League (NFL),47 the National Basketball Association 
(NBA),48 and Major League Baseball (MLB),49 which collectively generated 
over $19 billion in revenues in the 2011–2012 season—despite the NBA 
season being shortened due to a labor dispute.50  Similar to the NCAA, these 
organizations also place restrictions on student-athletes, some of which 
generate litigation.51 
The NFL requires an athlete to be either out of high school for three years 
or to have finished at least three college football seasons before entering the 
league,52 aiming to protect: 
1. Players who are less physically and psychologically 
mature from heightened risk of injury; 
2. The NFL’s entertainment product from the negative 
consequences associated with such injuries; 
3. The NFL teams from costs and liability associated with 
such injuries; and 
4. Young players from self-abuse53 in an attempt to reach 
the NFL early.54 
NFL regulations allow teams to sign players to their practice squads,55 but a 
 
46. Id. at 544–46. 
47. NFL, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
48. NBA, NBA.COM http://www.nba.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
49. MLB, MLB.COM http://mlb.mlb.com/home (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
50. Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RES., http://www.plunkettresearch.com/sports-recreat 
ion-leisure-market-research/industry-statistics (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). 
51. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
52. National Football League Eligibility Rules, NFL REGIONAL COMBINES, https://www.nfl 
regionalcombines.com/Docs/Eligibility%20rules.pdf. (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) 
53. Namely, overtraining and steroid use.  Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004), rev’d, 369 F.3d 124, 125–26 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
54. Id.; see infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. 
55. NFL, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 33, § 1(a) (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA]. 
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player has to satisfy the fundamental draft requirements to qualify.56  In 2003, 
after having been suspended by the university for accepting extra benefits,57 
then-Ohio State running back Maurice Clarett challenged the NFL eligibility 
rules on antitrust grounds.58  The Second Circuit noted that it was undisputed 
that Clarett was “an accomplished and talented amateur football player”59 and 
held in favor of the NFL, stating, “[t]his lawsuit reflects simply a prospective 
employee’s disagreement with the criteria, established by the employer and the 
labor union, that he must meet in order to be considered for employment.”60 
Other sports have less strenuous restrictions on players’ draft eligibility.61  
For example, the NBA requires an athlete to be at least nineteen-years-old and 
to be at least one year removed from high school before the athlete may enter 
the draft.62  The MLB rules are even more lenient; players do not actively 
enter the draft.63  Rather, high school graduates who have not yet attended 
college and college players who have completed their junior year or turned 
twenty-one are eligible to be drafted by a MLB team in the yearly draft.64 
2.  Agents 
Often labeled as “the bad guy,”65 agents are familiar with the numbers 
discussed above and have experience in exploring the choices and leverage 
available to the student-athletes.66  Student-athletes work with agents to bridge 
the gap in contract negotiation expertise between the athlete and a professional 
 
56. Id. art. 6, § 2(d). 
57. Mike Freeman, Football; Buckeyes Suspend Clarett for Year, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2003), 
http://www .nytimes.com/2003/09/11/sports/football-buckeyes-suspend-clarett-for-year.html. 
58. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125. 
59. Id. at 126,  n.2 (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 143. 
61. See NBA & NBPA, CBA 101: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2011 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (NBA) AND THE NATIONAL 
BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (NBPA) 25 (2012) [hereinafter NBA CBA 101]; First-Year 
Player Draft: Official Rules, MLB.COM: EVENTS, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last 
updated May 14, 2013). 
62. NBA CBA 101, supra note 61, at 25; see also Salgado, supra note 4, at 146. 
63. See First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 61; Robert Rosner, NCAA’s Stance on 
MLB Draft Is Its Best Towards the Big Three, SEBASTIAN’S CORNER (June 21, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
http://umesls.tumblr.com/post/6755412125/ncaas-stance-on-mlb-draft-is-its-best-towards-the-big. 
64. First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 61. 
65. See generally Symposium, supra note 12, at 346 (referring to legislation designed to protect 
“the welfare of both student athletes and academic institutions by policing the activities of athlete 
agents”). 
66. Id. at 355. 
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club.67  The athlete-agent market has grown increasingly competitive due to 
an increase in the number of agents,68 an increase in professional player 
salaries,69 and industry consolidation.70  Given the many agents competing to 
represent a limited number of athletes and the earning potential for those 
agents who land clients, unethical, or even illegal, conduct has become more 
common.71  In an attempt to provide better protection for student-athletes and 
universities, many states began enacting legislation to govern the actions of 
athlete agents,72 but many of these statutes, which were rarely enforced, 
 
67. Id. 
68. Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry, supra note 14, at 793.  For example, in 2006, 
there were 350 agents and 400 players in the NBA; 150 agents and 700 players in the NHL; 900 
agents and 1,900 players in the NFL; and 300 agents and 1,200 players in the MLB.  Id.  An NFL 
study showed that by 2003, 50% of the agents had no clients, and a 2006 estimate suggests that less 
than 10% of the NFL agents can make a living solely from agent representation.  Id. at 794. 
69. Id. at 794.  Television contracts, merchandising, and union-negotiated favorable minimum 
salaries have led to a significant increase in player salaries.  Id.  In 1983, the number one NFL-draft 
pick, John Elway, received a $1 million signing bonus.  Id.  In 2004, the number-one pick, Carson 
Palmer, received $10 million.  Id. at 795.  As a direct result of the increasing player salaries, the 
potential earnings for an agent have greatly increased.  Id. at 796.  In 2005, the NFL, NBA, NHL, and 
MLB players earned a total of $7.685 billion, of which agents received $385 million.  Id. at 797. 
70. Id. at 799.  As the athlete-agent industry has become part of the larger entertainment industry, 
the potential services provided by agents have increased both in number and complexity.  Id. at 791.  
As athletes identify the particular services required—generally, well beyond the scope of negotiating 
a contract—many of them now look to work with more than one agent.  Id. at 792.  Today, typical 
agent functions include: contract negotiations; medical-needs assessment; career counseling, legal 
consultation; post-career planning; money management; and off-the-field counseling.  Walter T. 
Champion, Jr., Attorneys Qua Sports Agents: An Ethical Conundrum, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 349, 
351–52 (1997) (“Regarding money management, the measure of success for an agent should be the 
athlete's financial security at retirement.”). 
71. Edelman, supra note 4, at 152–54; see also Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry, 
supra note 14, at 801.  Some agents would more or less do anything to gain an advantage, including 
offering money to induce amateur athletes to secure clients and a better cut of any professional 
earnings the athlete may collect down the road.  Edelman, supra note 4, at 153.  Others have 
prioritized their own cut before the athlete’s terms, negotiated with teams in which the agent had a 
direct financial interest, or even served as the president for the team with which the athlete was 
negotiating.  See Brown v. Woolf, 554 F. Supp. 1206, 1207 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (agent negotiated down 
player’s benefits but retained his own full portion); see also Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. 
Supp. 542, 546 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (agent did not follow common practices because agent wanted 
player to sign with the team he owned). 
72. Because of the increasing unethical behavior, ethical sports agents and NCAA were 
proponents of statutory law governing the sports agents.  The drafting of the Uniform Athlete Agents 
Act (UAAA) began in 1996 at the urging of Florida State University president Sandy D’Alemberte.  
Symposium, supra note 12, at 359.  Several of the seventeen drafters on the committee had direct ties 
to the NCAA; none of the committee members were professional athletes or recent college athletes.  
Id. at 360; Edelman, supra note 4, at 168–69.  The sports agents recognized a need to stop the 
downward ethical spiral, and the NCAA recognized an opportunity to curtail payments between 
agents and student-athletes in violation of NCAA’s principle of amateurism.  Edelman, supra note 4, 
at 166–67. 
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conflicted with NCAA regulations.73  For example, by completely prohibiting 
agents and student-athletes from interacting with each other, some state 
statutes removed the few protections for student-athletes actually provided by 
the NCAA bylaws.74  Nonetheless, by 2001, twenty-six states75 had 
individually legislated civil and criminal penalties for athlete-agent 
misconduct; eleven classified some of the misconduct as a felony.76 
 
73. Payne, supra note 18, at 666–67. 
74. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.3.2.  Relationships between student-athletes and 
agents or educational institutions were originally covered by the statutes and common law of agency 
and contract in each state.  John A. Gray, Sports Agent’s Liability After SPARTA?, 6 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 141, 143–44 (2006); see, e.g., Dishman v. Jones, No. 2002-05380, 2003 WL 25466262 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 2003) (awarding professional player $396,000 plus interest against agent and 
financial advisor).  Before present legislation, NCAA member institutions looked to recover against 
agents under the theory of tortious interference with contractual relations.  See Moore, supra note 13, 
at 537 (citing Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Tex. 1991)).  When any 
form of contractual agreement exists between a student-athlete and an educational institution, courts 
will presume that an agent is aware of the agreement, its terms, and any NCAA restrictions placed on 
the student-athlete, and any intentional action by the agent—such as offering a contract or a benefit—
becomes a direct cause of any resulting ineligibility and consequential penalties against the 
institution.  See Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that 
student-athlete breached contract with university when not complying with the training rules or 
physical eligibility requirements); Williams v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 752 N.E.2d 367, 375 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 
2001) (holding that basketball player who signed a national letter of intent entered into a contract with 
the university and later violated the contract by failing to remain academically eligible); Payne, supra 
note 18, at 665.  The problem with recovery in the rare civil actions brought against agents by 
student-athletes was that NCAA student-athletes are expected to know and adhere to the NCAA 
regulations, and the more-or-less automatic contributory negligence by the student-athlete could both 
mitigate the agent’s liability and reduce any potential damages.  Id. at 664; see, e.g., IND. CODE. § 34-
51-2-6(a) (2013) (“[T]he claimant is barred from recovery if the claimant's contributory fault is 
greater than the fault of all persons whose fault proximately contributed to the claimant's damages.”).  
Criminal laws also did not deter illegal conduct.  Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why 
Current Federal and State Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National 
Licensing System May Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1225, 1237 (2004); see also United 
States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).  In Walters, a sports agent recruited student-athletes 
to enter into agreements with him for future representation in exchange for immediate benefits, post-
dating the agreements to avoid interfering with the student-athletes’ NCAA eligibility so that the 
student-athletes could continue to receive scholarships.  Id. at 1221.  After fifty-six of the fifty-eight 
student-athletes solicited in this manner later signed with other agents, the agent resorted to threats to 
collect his money.  Id.  He and his partner were charged with conspiracy, RICO violations, and fraud.  
Id.  The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that the prosecution failed to prove fraud and reversed the 
initial conviction.  Id. at 1221, 1227. 
75. Specifically, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Texas.  Sudia & Remis, supra note 4, at 271–72 & n.32. 
76. Id.  The classifications differed widely from state to state, with eleven states classifying all or 
some agent misconduct as felonies, and twenty states classifying all or some agent misconduct as 
misdemeanors.  Id. at 272–73.  The typical state legislation covered at least the following aspects of 
athlete agent business: (1) restrictions on the agent’s license; (2) posting and forfeiture of surety 
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Forty states ultimately adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA), 
which encourages agents to voluntarily comply with registration, written 
agency agreements, and other requirements; outlines criminal and 
administrative penalties; and creates a civil remedy that provides NCAA 
member schools penalized for conduct arising from an agent’s or a student-
athlete’s violation of the UAAA with a civil cause of action against both the 
agent and the student-athlete.77  The UAAA turns the NCAA’s private 
principles of amateurism into law by imposing requirements that pertain to the 
NCAA rules.78  In 2004, Congress enacted the Sports Agents Responsibility 
and Trust Act (SPARTA), which is very similar to UAAA in many aspects 
and provides educational institutions with a federal cause of action against 
agents whose SPARTA violations result in institutional expenses arising from 
NCAA-imposed penalties.79 Notwithstanding these statutes, legislative 
attempts to regulate agent behavior have largely been unsuccessful,80 and 
although widely adopted among the states, the UAAA has been frequently 
criticized for subordinating the interests of student-athletes to those of the 
NCAA member institutions.81 
 
bonds or malpractice insurance; (3) legal validity of the agent contract and the athlete’s ability to 
rescind the contract; (4) forfeiture of the agent’s right to repayment of items paid on behalf of the 
athlete; (5) refunds of monies paid to the agent by the athlete or on her behalf; (6) civil and 
administrative fines; (7) civil causes of action against the agent by the athlete, university, state, or 
other injured person or business; and (8) criminal fines or imprisonment.  Id. at 274. 
77. ADAM EPSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 11, 11–12 (2013); Sudia & Remis, supra note 4, at 267, 279; 
see also UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT §§ 5, 10(b)–(c), 11, 15, 17 (2000) (requiring both agent and 
student-athlete to communicate any NCAA-violating agreement to the student-athlete’s institution). 
78. Edelman, supra note 4, at 172; Alan Scher Zagier, Laws on Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, 
HUFFPOST C. (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/laws-on-sports-agentsrar_ 
n_685000.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
79. See Sports Agency Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–08 (2012); 
JAMES SENSENBRENNER, H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 2, at 4 (2003), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N 
1021, 1022.  With much of its language remarkably similar to that of the UAAA, SPARTA has been 
criticized on many of the same grounds, including failing to provide a civil cause of action for 
student-athletes who are harmed by their agents; but, at least SPARTA—unlike the UAAA—does not 
grant a civil cause of action to NCAA member institutions against their own student-athletes.  
Edelman, supra note 4, at 177–79; see Remick & Cabott, supra note 4, at 12. 
80. Edelman, supra note 4, at 24–26.  Several factors contribute to this lack of enforcement: (1) 
lack of resources; (2) sports-agent issues are not a prosecutorial priority; (3) the NCAA is largely a 
passive enforcement body relying on information presented to it; (4) because of potential NCAA 
investigations or sanctions and the risk of being tagged with constructive knowledge, the NCAA 
member institutions are reluctant to investigate agents; (5) any potential damages award—supposed to 
make up for sanctions implemented by the NCAA—is financially unlikely to be recovered from an 
individual agent; and (6) an NCAA member institution would risk severe damage to its reputation if it 
brought suit against a current or former student-athlete.  Id.; Willenbacher, supra note 74, at 1246–47. 
81. Edelman, supra note 4, at 171–72, 179. 
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D.  The Student-Athlete 
While some student-athletes accept athletic scholarships to obtain a 
university education, many are driven by the fact that playing sports at the 
collegiate level is virtually a requirement to play professionally.82  Both 
football players and men’s basketball players “identify themselves more 
strongly as athletes than as students . . . [and give] more weight in choosing [a] 
college to athletics than to academics.”83  In 2011,84 the graduation rates 
(given six years to complete the degree) for football and basketball players 
were 16% and 25% below the college average, respectively.85 
College is often a necessary piece of the professional athletics puzzle86 
since, as set out above,87 the NFL requires an athlete to be either out of high 
school for three years or to have finished at least three college football seasons 
before entering the league,88 and the NBA sets out similar requirements.89  As 
a result, student-athletes must place their chances to make it to the professional 
level in the hands of their coaches and educational institutions.90  And despite 
the stepping stone that college provides, less than 2% of NCAA football and 
basketball players actually make it from NCAA to professional sports.91 
 
82. Former professional football player Michael Strahan stated in an interview, “Most guys in 
college . . . major in sports because they’ve been told since they were kid [sic], you’re going to be a 
professional athlete.” Symposium, supra note 12, at 368.  Former professional football and baseball 
player Deion Sanders, when asked while playing football for Florida State whether he wanted to be in 
college, answered: “No, but I have to be.”  Moore, supra note 13, at 520. 
83. Gary Gutting, The Myth of the ‘Student-Athlete,’ NYTIMES.COM (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:30 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/the-myth-of-the-student-athlete/. 
84. The NCAA also released a report on graduation rates in 2012, but that report does not include 
the matched-gender ethnicity data breakdown by sport; but both the 2011 and the 2012 reports 
suggest that the overall student-athlete graduation rate was 65%.  Compare NCAA RESEARCH, 
TRENDS IN GRADUATION-SUCCESS RATES AND FEDERAL GRADUATION RATES AT NCAA DIVISION I 
INSTITUTIONS 44 (2012), with NCAA RESEARCH, TRENDS IN GRADUATION-SUCCESS RATES AND 
FEDERAL GRADUATION RATES AT NCAA DIVISION I INSTITUTIONS 23 (2011). 
85. Gutting, supra note 83. 
86. Salgado, supra note 4, at 146. 
87. See supra Part II.C.1. 
88. National Football League Eligibility Rules, supra note 52 (allowing athletes to apply for 
special eligibility following beginning and completion of the third NFL season after the athlete’s 
high-school graduation). 
89. NBA CBA 101, supra note 61; see also Salgado, supra note 4, at 146. 
90. Salgado, supra note 4, at 146. 
91. Id. at 145.  The number of NCAA student-athletes going professional, with the exception of 
baseball, is low across the different sports, per a September 2012 NCAA study, which suggests the 
following percentage of NCAA athletes taking the step from NCAA to professional sports: men’s 
basketball: 1.3%, women’s basketball: 0.9%, football: 1.6%, baseball: 9.7%, men’s ice hockey: 1.2%, 
men’s soccer: 0.7%.  NCAA RESEARCH, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF COMPETING IN ATHLETICS 
BEYOND THE HIGH SCHOOL INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL (2012), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
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Further, many of these young student-athletes are unsophisticated92 and, 
for some, the socio-economic profile adds to their vulnerability.93  For 
example, many student-athletes come from financially disadvantaged and 
substantially poorer backgrounds than the general college population.94  For a 
vast majority of these college athletes, however, sports remain a dead end 
instead of an escape from life in poverty,95 and the average “full scholarship” 
Division I athlete has to pay $2,951 annually for school-related expenses that 
are not covered by scholarships and grants.96  Several former student-athletes 
have admitted to receiving money in violation of NCAA regulations because 
their scholarships were insufficient to cover rent and food.97 
Many of the student-athletes who graduate but do not go professional98 
have been led “to believe the hours of training . . . and teamwork is more 
beneficial than any internship or job experience.”99  They lack professional 
 
wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/estimated+probability+of+competing+in+athletics+beyond+the+
high+school+interscholastic+level.  The numbers are estimations of how many college athletes will 
be drafted by the professional leagues; a statistical breakdown suggests that the chance to play Major 
League baseball drops steeply in proportion to the draft round: first round, 66% chance; second 
round, 49% chance; third to fifth round, 32% chance; sixth to tenth round, 20%; eleventh to twentieth 
round, 11%; twenty-first round, 7%.  Mike Rosenbaum, Examining the Percentage of MLB Draft 
Picks Who Reach the Major Leagues, BLEACHER REP. (June 12, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/ 
articles/1219356-examining-the-percentage-of-mlb-draft-picks-that-reach-the-major-leagues. 
92. Salgado, supra note 4, at 144.  Because the areas of the brain concerned with self-regulation 
and goal setting keep developing well into the twenties, student-athletes are highly susceptible to 
stimuli and stressful situations and are consequently vulnerable in such situations.  See Geoffrey 
Rapp, The Brain of the College Athlete, 8 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 153–54 
(2012). 
93. Salgado, supra note 4, at 145. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Associated Press, Study: ‘Free Ride’ Still Costs Athletes, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2010), http://sports. 
espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5728653. 
97. George Dohrmann, Confessions of an Agent, SI.COM (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html.  However, roughly two-thirds 
of the class of 2010 (athletes and non-athletes included) took loans for college and owed an average 
of $25,250 upon graduation, suggesting that the “full scholarship” athletes are far from disadvantaged 
compared to their fellow students.  Justin Pope, Average Student Loan Debt: $25,250, HUFFPOST C. 
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/average-student-debt-2525_n_10733 
35.html.  Other studies suggest that 72% of college athletes expect to owe student loan debt when 
they graduate—numbers aligning surprisingly well with the roughly two thirds of the class of 2010 
graduating with student loans.  See id.; Stacy A. Teicher, College Athletes Tackle Their Financial 
Future, CSMONITOR.COM (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1003/p13s02-legn.html. 
98. Recent NCAA numbers suggest that basketball and football players graduate at a rate of 74% 
and 70%, respectively.  Erik Christianson, DI Men’s Basketball, FBS Football Graduation Rates 
Highest Ever, NCAA.COM (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-10-25/di-
mens-basketball-fbs-football-graduation-rates-highest-ever. 
99. Stephanie Stark, College Athletes Suffer the Greatest Injustice from NCAA, USA TODAY C. 
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experience and have comparatively little knowledge about their chosen fields 
of study upon graduation.100  Chris Davis, an Ohio University graduate with a 
3.6 GPA, a pre-medical degree, and leadership experience as the head of his 
Division I cross country team, graduated without connections and experience 
in his field.101  Now, he is behind his non-athletic peers when it comes to 
career preparation, college’s ultimate purpose, stating, “I didn’t do the 
volunteering because I didn’t have the time focusing on athletics. I didn’t do 
them and they’re essential to get a job or get into grad school.”102  Despite the 
many hurdles, however, 36% of student-athletes expect to become 
millionaires.103 
III.  REGULATIONS AND THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
While a student-athlete voluntarily accepts an athletic scholarship, the 
relationship between a student-athlete and the program is considerably less 
voluntary than it appears.104  Student-athletes must place their faith in the 
institution and its coach, who decides which players get the opportunity, 
exposure, renewed scholarships,105 and playing time,106 making the chance to 
go professional contingent largely on the coach and institution.107  Despite the 
small likelihood of student-athletes going professional,108 “coaches often 
emphasize and encourage such dreams by promising starting positions and 
playing time.”109  After student-athletes commit to a program, coaches expect 
 
(Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.usatodayeducate.com/staging/index.php/blog/college-athletes-suffer-the-
greatest-injustice-from-ncaa. 
100. Id.  Jon Gissinger, former tight-end and a graduate from the University of Missouri, said 
that “[a] football player is not going to get a job over someone who worked and had 
internships . . . . My résumé right now is football.”  Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Teicher, supra note 97.  Nikki Thompson, a junior student-athlete at the University of 
Hartford, said that “[a] lot of the athletes don't really think about [planning for the future] because 
we're more focused on what we have to do now, day to day, rather than our financial situations after 
school.”  Id. 
104. See Salgado, supra note 4, at 148. 
105. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a one-year 
limit to scholarships and a limit on scholarships per team . . . are not inherently or obviously 
necessary for the preservation of amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general product of college 
football,” but holding that plaintiffs failed to identify a relevant cognizable market for its antitrust 
claim). 
106. Salgado, supra note 4, at 146. 
107. See id. 
108. See supra Part II.D. 
109. See Salgado, supra note 4, at 147. 
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them to maintain eligibility, academic or otherwise, and submit to all coaching 
demands.110  If a student-athlete fails to do so, the athlete will lose eligibility 
or be benched by the coach.111 
“While student-athletes can, in theory, walk away at any time,” returning 
to minimum wage jobs or unemployment is not enticing in comparison to the 
high risk-high reward prospect of professional play.112  Often, the only option 
is to stay in a program, hoping for the best.113  In addition, NCAA regulations 
limit the student-athletes’ ability to leave one program for another.114  Further 
underscoring an institution’s power over its student-athletes, an athletic 
program director can cut a player from the program at his or her own 
discretion and be “liable to fulfill only the remainder of the scholarship for the 
year awarded.”115 
Member institutions’ willingness to partake in the lucrative athletic 
endorsement field illustrates the “institutional commercial behavior that 
generates cynicism on the part of student-athletes and thereby undermines 
[from the inside] the amateurism and educational values professed to underlie 
NCAA rules and regulations.”116  This situation “fosters an environment in 
which athletes might be more tempted than ever to accept money or 
gifts . . . in violation of [NCAA] rules, or leave school well before their 
scheduled graduation dates.”117  In addition, the resulting “student-athlete 
attitudes concerning those charged with enforcement responsibilities 
significantly contribute to the devaluation of NCAA rules and the principles 
on which they are premised.”118  Meanwhile, the NCAA, employing 500 at its 
national office in Indianapolis, Indiana, recorded nearly $872 million in 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 148. 
113. Id. 
114. Id.  A Division I athlete transferring to another program generally has to sit out an entire 
year.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 14.5.5.1. 
115. Salgado, supra note 4, at 148–49; see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344, 347 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (upholding NCAA regulations capping athletic scholarships at one year following a lawsuit 
on antitrust grounds by former Rice football player Joseph Agnew, who suffered injuries and lost his 
athletic scholarship before his senior year, because he failed to properly identify a relevant market). 
116. See Davis, Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure, supra note 41, at 214. 
117. Id. at 215 (quoting Rob Zatechka, Outright Pay Is Not the Only Alternative, NCAA NEWS, 
Aug 3, 1994, at 4–5). 
118. Id. at 214, 216.  In 2011, any University of Texas football player had a “fair market value” 
of $513,922, and any Duke basketball player had a fair market value of $1,025,656.  RAMOGI HUMA 
& ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 16 (2012), 
available at http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf. 
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revenue for the 2011–2012 year.119 
As a result of the tension in the current situation, recent litigation directly 
or indirectly involving the NCAA only underlines the problem.  The causes of 
action brought against the NCAA include: (1) declaring ineligible a student-
athlete who had legal representation when meeting with representatives of 
professional teams;120 (2) capping the number and length of scholarships;121 
(3) permanently disqualifying a student-athlete who was determined to have 
received inappropriate tutoring assistance;122 (4) forcing prospective student-
athletes to relinquish all rights to their likenesses in order to be eligible to play 
college sports;123 and (5) requiring inconsistent academic standards from 
transferring student-athletes based on their high school performance.124 
A.  Regulatory Inconsistencies 
Current NCAA regulations generally do not distinguish between being 
professional and entering into a draft.125  Following full-time collegiate 
enrollment, “an individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the 
individual asks to be placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a 
 
119. The NCAA Budget: Where the Money Goes, supra note 42; Steve Berkowitz, NCAA had 
Recorded $71 Million Surplus in Fiscal 2012, USATODAY.COM (May 2, 2013) http://www.usatoday. 
com/story/sports/college/2013/05/02/ncaa-financial-statement-surplus/2128431/. 
120. Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶¶ 9–13 (C.P.) 
(vacated pursuant to settlement) (describing the relevant NCAA rules as “arbitrary.”); see infra Part 
III.B.1. 
121. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “a one-year 
limit to scholarships and a limit on scholarships per team . . . are not inherently or obviously 
necessary for the preservation of amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general product of college 
football” but holding that plaintiffs failed to identify a relevant cognizable market for its antitrust 
claim). 
122. McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) 
(holding that a collegiate football player who suffered NCAA sanctions but later signed with the 
Baltimore Ravens did not have standing to sue the NCAA because the alleged injury to his football 
career was too speculative, and because he signed a professional contract, he obtained the relief 
sought, making his claim moot). 
123. Russell v. NCAA, No. C 11–4938 CW, 2012 WL 1747496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012) 
(alleging that the NCAA, through its rules and forms, requires student-athletes to relinquish the 
relevant rights in order to be eligible to participate in college basketball). 
124. Davis v. NCAA, No. C 11–01207 WHA, 2011 WL 2531394, at *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 
2011) (holding that such differences survived a rational-basis review). 
125. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.01.1 (“Only an amateur student-athlete is 
eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.”), with id. art. 12.1.2(f) (“An 
individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a 
particular sport if the individual . . . [a]fter initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a 
professional draft.”). 
SOEDERBAUM COMMENT FORMATTED FINAL 2/3/2014  11:00 AM 
2013] LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 279 
professional league in that sport,”126 even if the individual later requests to be 
removed from the list prior to the actual draft, the individual is not drafted, or 
“the individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with” a professional 
team.127  This language highlights some of the major problems with the 
NCAA regulations when viewed in light of the drafting methods of the various 
professional leagues.  While the NBA and NFL require student-athletes with 
remaining collegiate eligibility to declare for the draft, MLB does not.128  
Rather, if an individual meets MLB’s draft-eligibility rules,129 the individual is 
available for selection.130  The MLB teams can draft any eligible player.131  
Then, the player may choose to remain in college if he feels he was drafted too 
low or if he simply wants to finish his collegiate career.132  In sum, a student-
athlete baseball player drafted by and negotiating with a professional team 
remains an amateur under NCAA regulations, while his football counterpart 
more or less loses his amateur status by merely declaring for the draft, without 
either negotiations or the receipt of benefits.133 
While it would not be fair to baseball players if they could lose their 
amateur status and remaining collegiate eligibility without any action on their 
own, the fact that the NCAA allows baseball players to be drafted without 
affecting their collegiate eligibility suggests that the NCAA makes unfair 
distinctions based on particular sports.134  Collegiate baseball players may be 
drafted and even negotiate for a professional contract without jeopardizing any 
remaining collegiate eligibility, while football and basketball players put all 
remaining eligibility at risk by entering the professional draft—regardless of 
whether they enter professional negotiations or are represented when doing 
so.135  The difference arises from the fact that football and basketball players 
decide whether they want to be in the draft, suggesting that the NCAA sees a 
 
126. Id. art. 12.2.4.2 (emphasis added). 
127. Id.  Exceptions basically allow student-athletes to enter a draft once—as long as they are not 
drafted and declare their intent to resume intercollegiate athletics shortly thereafter.  See id. art. 
12.2.4.2.3–12.2.4.2.4. 
128. John Infante, Draft Rules Fail Basics of Amateurism, NCAA.ORG (Feb. 17, 2011), http://ww 
w.ncaa .org/blog/2011/02/draft-rules-fail-basics-of-amateurism/. 
129. See First-Year Player Draft: Official Rules, supra note 61. 
130. Infante, supra note 128. 
131. Rosner, supra note 63. 
132. Id. 
133. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.2.4.2. 
134. See id. art. 12.2.3.2 (“[A]n individual may compete on a tennis, golf, two-person sand 
volleyball or two-person synchronized diving team with persons who are competing for cash or a 
comparable prize, provided the individual does not receive payment of any kind for such 
participation.”). 
135. See id. art. 12.2.4.2. 
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difference between a football player wishing to establish his market value by 
entering the draft and a baseball player doing the same by actually negotiating 
with a professional team.136 
B.  Case Studies 
1.  Oliver’s Twist: Challenging the No-Agent Rule 
In the fall of 2005, Andrew Oliver signed a letter of intent to attend 
Oklahoma State University (OSU) to play baseball.137  The following spring, 
Oliver retained the services of Robert and Tim Baratta as sports advisors and 
attorneys.138  In June that year, the Minnesota Twins drafted Oliver and later 
that summer, during a meeting with Oliver and his father—a meeting Tim 
Baratta attended—the Twins offered Oliver $390,000 to sign.139  After 
consulting with his father, Oliver turned down the offer and decided to instead 
pursue a collegiate career with OSU.140  Oliver played his first two years with 
OSU before he decided to terminate the services of the Barattas and instead 
retain a different advisor.141 
Following an unsuccessful attempt to reconnect with Oliver, the Barattas 
sent Oliver an invoice for $113,750 for legal services.142  Oliver claimed that 
he had received no services or benefits from the Barattas and contacted an 
attorney for assistance.143  The Barattas then reported alleged bylaw violations 
by Oliver to the NCAA, specifically referring to the meeting that Tim Baratta 
attended.144  As a result of the allegations, OSU found that Oliver had violated 
 
136. Id.  “Entering a draft and deciding any contract offered would not be worth leaving college 
is no more or less an indication of a student-athlete’s intent to professionalize themselves than 
deciding a contract offer is not sufficient to leave college and enter the draft in the first place.”  
Infante, supra note 128. 
137. Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 4 (C.P.) 
(vacated pursuant to settlement). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. ¶ 6. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. ¶7; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.2.1.  The Barattas promised to 
protect Oliver’s amateur status.  Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 40.   Despite this, Tim Baratta 
insisted to be present during Oliver’s meeting with the Twins, but no testimony suggested that Baratta 
did anything but merely observe during the meeting.  Id.  Under NCAA rules, “[a] lawyer may not be 
present during discussions of a contract offer with a professional organization . . . . A lawyer’s 
presence during such discussions is considered representation by an agent.”  NCAA MANUAL, supra 
note 15, art.12.3.2.1. 
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the NCAA no-agent rule and suspended Oliver indefinitely.145  After a 
temporary restraining order reinstated Oliver, the NCAA suspended him for 
one year and charged him a year of eligibility.146  Oliver sued the NCAA and 
requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.147 
The court held that “[i]t [was] unquestionable that [the NCAA] and OSU’s 
contractual agreement [was] created to confer a benefit in the student-
athletes”148 because the NCAA promises to “initiate, stimulate, and improve 
intercollegiate athletic programs for student-athletes.”149  As a student-athlete, 
Oliver was an intended third-party beneficiary.150  Because the parties to a 
contract must act in good faith and fair dealing, “there must be in fact honesty 
and reasonableness in the enforcement of the contract.”151 
The NCAA purports to allow student-athletes to retain a lawyer, but its 
regulations prevent the lawyer from helping the student-athlete during contract 
negotiations.152  The court noted, “This surely does not retain a clear line of 
demarcation between amateurism and professionalism. . ..[I]t allows for 
exploitation of the student-athlete by ‘professional and commercial 
enterprises’ in contravention of [the NCAA’s intention to protect the amateur 
character of college athletics].”153  The court concluded that NCAA bylaw 
12.3.2.1 was capricious and arbitrary before addressing what sort of relief 
might be available to Oliver.154 
The court reviewed NCAA bylaw 19.7,155 which imposes penalties on 
student-athletes and institutions that rely on court orders that are later 
overturned.156  The court pointed out that, under this rule, educational 
institutions face a dilemma: they can either play the student-athlete and risk 
sanctions by the NCAA if the court order is later overturned, or they can try to 
 
145. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 7. 
146. Id. ¶ 8. 
147. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. 
148. Id. ¶ 27. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. ¶ 28. 
151. Id. ¶ 30. 
152. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.3.2 (allowing student-athlete to retain 
advice from lawyer concerning a professional contract), with id. art. 12.3.2.1 (prohibiting such lawyer 
from being present during actual negotiations). 
153. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 38.  The court used an analogy to elaborate: “[This] is akin 
to a patient hiring a doctor, but the doctor is told by the hospital board and the insurance company that 
he cannot be present when the patient meets with a surgeon because the conference may improve his 
patient’s decision-making power.”  Id. ¶ 42. 
154. Id. 
155. Now Bylaw 19.13.  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.13. 
156. Id. art. 19.13. 
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avoid future NCAA sanctions by not playing the student-athlete and instead 
risk finding themselves in contempt of court.157  The court described the 
regulation as “arbitrary and indeed a violation of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing . . . .”158  Concluding that Oliver “would suffer loss of his 
college baseball experience, impairment or loss of his future professional 
baseball career, loss in being available for the upcoming draft, and ongoing 
damage to [his] reputation and baseball career,” the court granted the 
injunctive relief.159 
2.  “Johnny Football”—A Hypothetical Case Study 
For student-athletes, the only given is that their chosen schools may 
benefit tremendously from their success.160  While Texas A&M may not use 
Johnny Manziel’s name, likeness, or nickname, it “can make money off of 
[him] by selling jerseys, T-shirts and hats with No. 2 on them.”161  Even 
before Manziel led A&M to victory against first-ranked Alabama in 2012, 
unlicensed “Johnny Football” merchandise circulated.162  After the huge win, 
the market exploded.163  When Manziel became the first freshman in history 
to win the Heisman trophy, it exploded again.164  Manziel generated $37 
million in media exposure for Texas A&M during his first year playing.165 
As a result of Manziel’s “inject[ing] excitement and hope into the Aggies’ 
 
157. Oliver, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, ¶ 46. 
158. Id.  The court noted that the relevant NCAA bylaw was named “Restitution” and went on to 
say that “[t]he old adage, that you can put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a pig, is quite relevant here.”  
Id. ¶ 45. 
159. Id. ¶¶ 59, 60.  But see McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 736 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2013) (holding that collegiate football player who suffered NCAA sanctions but later signed 
with the Baltimore Ravens did not have standing to sue the NCAA because the alleged injury to his 
football career was too speculative, and because he signed a professional contract, he obtained the 
relief sought, making his claim moot). 
160. See Davis, Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure, supra note 41, at 214–15. 
161. Darren Rovell, Will Johnny Manziel Ever Cash in?, ESPN (Dec. 7, 2012, 10:47 AM), http:// 
espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2547/will-johnny-manziel-ever-cash-in [hereinafter 
Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?]. 
162. Allen Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Quarterback’s Family to Trademark ‘Johnny 
Football,’ EAGLE, http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/article_85bb1ade-1e0e-5a26-a492-d1d598b 
87e29.html (last updated Nov. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Family to 
Trademark].  “One seller on eBay who claims to be selling the original ‘Johnny Football’ shirt lists 
that he's sold 625 of them.”  Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161. 
163. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161. 
164. Id. (“The business surrounding his number, name and likeness went from a cottage industry 
to a small economy.”). 
165. Study, supra note 1. 
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football program,” A&M’s football revenues will likely increase.166  During 
the 2011–2012 academic year, “when [A&M was] still a member of the Big 
12 [Conference], the Aggies generated $44.4 million in football revenues and 
$79 million in overall athletic revenues.”167  The excitement generated by 
Johnny Football,168 combined with the greater expectations of what is to come 
in his subsequent years in College Station, will likely boost (1) merchandise 
sales; (2) ticket sales; (3) alumni donations;169 (4) stadium advertising; (5) 
athletic recruiting; and (6) A&M undergraduate applications.170 
In February 2013, Manziel, through JMAN2 Enterprises, filed an 
application with the United States Patent & Trademark Office seeking to 
register “Johnny Football.”171  With the trademark comes the responsibility 
for policing the name, sending the cease-and-desist letters, and paying the 
legal fees.172  As long as Manziel plays college football, neither he nor his 
family can make money from the trademark “Johnny Football,” as doing so 
would endanger his collegiate eligibility.173  But they can pay to protect it.174 
 
166. Patrick Rishe, Johnny Football, Texas A&M, and Brand Penetration: The Power of One, 
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2012/11/28/johnny-football-texas-am-
and-brand-penetration-the-power-of-one/ [hereinafter Rishe, Brand Penetration]. 
167. Id. 
168. Study, supra note 1. 
169. See Allen Reed, Texas A&M Breaks Fundraising Record with $740 Million in Donations, 
EAGLE, http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/article_82266d1a-11c0-543b-b75a-4c3613357abe.html 
(last updated Sept. 17, 2013) (stating that between September 1, 2012, and August 31, 2013, Texas 
A&M University took in nearly $300 million more in donations than any previous fiscal year and that 
Johnny Manziel, the football program’s success, and the move to the SEC played significant part in 
the increase).  Texas A&M University’s football-related donations increased from $15.7 million to 
$17.7 million in 2012 and are expected to increase to $18.6 million in 2013.  George Schroeder, Why 
Texas A&M Is ‘The Best It’s Ever Been,’ USATODAY.COM (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday. 
com/story/sports/ncaaf/sec/2013/09/12/texas-am-rise-since-joining-sec/2805701/. 
170. Patrick Rishe, Magnificent Johnny Manziel Is Money at Cotton Bowl, but HIS Money Is 
Years Away, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/01/05/magnificent-john 
ny-manziel-is-money-at-cotton-bowl-but-his-money-is-years-away/ [hereinafter Rishe, Money at 
Cotton Bowl].  Boston College saw a “Flutie Effect” on their applications (30% increase) for two 
years after Heisman winner Doug Flutie’s famous Hail Mary throw that secured the win against 
Miami in 1984.  Rishe, Brand Penetration, supra note 166; Dena Potter, ‘Flutie Effect’ Is Real, Study 
Shows, SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 23, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/sports/article/Flutie-Effect-is-real-
study-shows-1268039.php.  Texas A&M University saw a 10% increase in applications for 2013, but 
the most noticeable effect occurred in the number of acceptances: more than 10,000 acceptances—as 
compared to the estimated 8,700—led to the largest freshman class in school history.  Schroeder, 
supra note 169. 
171. Darren Rovell, Suit Claims Nickname Infringement, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-foot 
ball/story/_/id/8977054/lawsuit-filed-claims-johnny-football-infringement (last updated Feb. 23, 
2013) [hereinafter Rovell, Nickname Infringement]. 
172. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161. 
173. Reed, Manziel Mania Prompts Family to Trademark, supra note 162; Rovell, Manziel Ever 
Cash in?, supra note 161.  Under NCAA rules, “[a]n individual loses amateur status and thus shall 
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For Manziel to fully capitalize on his own success, he cannot peak too 
early, the players around him cannot drop in quality, and—most importantly—
he must avoid serious injuries.175  Everyone except Manziel gains monetarily 
now.176  Even assuming that Manziel intends to declare for the draft as soon as 
he is eligible to do so, he has to wait at least until May 2014 before an NFL 
team can draft him and he can become a professional football player.177  If he, 
for any of the above reasons, never has the opportunity to go professional, he 
will never receive his share for making A&M’s football program bloom.178 
Of course, Manziel may choose to purchase “career-ending” insurance.179  
Private insurers offer premiums ranging from $7,000 to $80,000 for $1 million 
to $10 million of coverage, respectively, to insure student-athletes.180  In 
addition, the NCAA offers the Exceptional Student-Athlete Disability 
Insurance program, with premiums ranging from $5,000 to $40,000 for 
$500,000 to $5 million of coverage.181  But, “[b]ecause career-ending injuries 
are rare,. . .fewer than 10 [student-athletes] have received payouts in the 
history of the program,” even though about 100 student-athletes participate 
 
not be eligible for intercollegiate competition . . . if the individual . . . [u]ses his or her athletics skill 
(directly or indirectly) for pay . . . .”  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2.  “Pay” includes 
“[a]ny direct or indirect salary, gratuity or comparable compensation.”  Id. art. 12.1.2.1.1. 
174. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161.  In a pending suit against an individual 
selling Johnny Football apparel, filed on February 15, 2013, JMAN2 Enterprises asks for injunctive 
relief, compensatory damages, and exemplary damages.  Complaint at 7, 21, JMAN2 Enters. L.L.C. 
v. Vaughan, No. 6:13CV00158 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 582308, at *3. 
175. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161; Mike Ozanian, Heisman Trophy Winner 
Manziel Punished by NCAA and NFL, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mike 
ozanian/2012/12/09/winning-heisman-trophy-winner-manziel-punished-by-ncaa-and-nfl/. 
176. Rishe, Money at Cotton Bowl, supra note 170. 
177. See Will Brinson, 2014 NFL Draft Date Set for May 8–10 at Radio City in New York, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (May 28, 2013), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/22314468/2014-nfl-
draft-date-set-for-may-8-10-at-radio-city-in-new-york; National Football League Eligibility Rules, 
supra note 52; Ozanian, supra note 175.  But see Goodbread supra, note 1 and accompanying text 
(stating that on January 8, 2014, Manziel made the choice to declare for the 2014 NFL draft and 
forfeit the remaining two years of NCAA eligibility).  However, while Manziel appear to reap his 
rewards, other student-athletes are likely to find themselves trapped by the very same shortcomings of 
the current regulations. 
178. Ozanian, supra note 175.  Forbes’ Patrick Rishe suggests that, at the very least “student-
athletes who are largely responsible for spikes in licensing revenues at their school be allowed to earn 
royalties with interest in a fund set aside for them to be redeemed upon graduation or departure from 
the school, with the amount redeemed being conditional upon how close the student-athlete came to 
completing their degree.”  Rishe, Money at Cotton Bowl, supra note 170. 
179. Gary Klein, USC’s Matt Barkley Weighs Costs, Benefits of Injury Insurance, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 23, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/23/sports/la-sp-nfl-insurance-20111224. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
SOEDERBAUM COMMENT FORMATTED FINAL 2/3/2014  11:00 AM 
2013] LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 285 
annually.182  If Manziel suffers a severe injury that is not career-ending183 but 
that leaves him a different player after recovering, he would fall between the 
coverage gaps and be out of luck.184  In addition, even a $10 million policy 
fades compared to the $50 million Sam Bradford secured following the 2010 
NFL draft.185  If Manziel is injured and loses the opportunity to write the 
professional chapter186 in the Johnny Football story, the collusive NCAA and 
NFL rules will have deprived him of considerable opportunities.187 
D.  Perspective: A Global View on Amateurism 
1.  International Regulatory Bodies 
Many global regulatory bodies have successfully drawn clear lines 
between “amateur” and “professional” without financially penalizing the 
athletes that play their sports.  According to Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA), the controlling body of the world’s most popular 
sport, soccer,188 “[a] professional is a player who has a written contract with a 
club and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he 
effectively incurs.  All other players are considered to be amateurs.”189  
Similarly, according to the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), “[a] 
professional player shall be an ice hockey player who is paid more for his ice 
hockey player activity than the expenses he directly incurs through playing ice 
 
182. Id. (noting that true career-ending injuries are rare). 
183. See id. 
184. University of Oklahoma quarterback Jason White won the Heisman trophy—after having 
gone through reconstructive surgery on each knee.  Associated Press, Ex-Sooners’ QB Says Knees 
Won’t Let Him Play, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2131507 (last updated Aug. 
11, 2005) [hereinafter Associated Press, Ex-Sooner’s Knees Won’t Let Him Play].  Following his 
injuries, White went undrafted despite his extensive college achievements and was competing for 
third quarterback with the Tennessee Titans.  Id.  While with the Titans, White felt that his knees did 
not allow him to chase the dream of playing professionally and decided to retire.  Id. 
185. Rovell, Manziel Ever Cash in?, supra note 161.  Two other Heisman-winners, Tim Tebow 
and Matt Leinart, have already made more than $13 million and $23 million, respectively.  Id. 
186. As compared to professional golfer Michelle Wie, who forfeited her NCAA eligibility by 
going professional and made close to $20 million in endorsements in 2006 alone.  Doug Ferguson, 
Michelle Wie Accepted to Stanford, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/19/AR2006121901240_pf.html. 
187. Ozanian, supra note 175.  It seems foreseeable that student-athletes placed in this situation 
are more tempted to violate NCAA rules by accepting benefits, especially those student-athletes who 
are unlikely to go professional and who want to get their money while they can.  See supra Part II.D. 
188. ERIC DUNNING, SPORT MATTERS: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SPORT, VIOLENCE AND 
CIVILISATION 103 (1999) (“During the twentieth century, soccer emerged as the world's most popular 
team sport.”). 
189. FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS art. 2, ¶ 2 (2012). 
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hockey.  All other players are considered non-professionals . . . .”190 
The governing bodies of predominantly individual sports have taken a 
similar, if more financially restrictive, approach.  The International Boxing 
Association (AIBA) renders ineligible for competition “[a]ny Boxer who 
enters into a contract, memorandum of understanding, pre-agreement or any 
other form of agreement, with an entity or individual other than AIBA . . ., 
related to such Boxer’s future participation in professional boxing or any other 
professional individual physical contact sport than boxing . . . .”191 
The Royal and Ancient Gold Club of St. Andrews (R&A) and United 
States Golf Association (USGA) regulate golf.192  Under R&A regulations, 
“an amateur golfer of golf skill or reputation must not use that skill or 
reputation for any financial gain.”193  Further, “[a]n amateur golfer must not 
play golf for prize money or its equivalent in a match, competition or 
exhibition.”194  The R&A and the USGA explicitly allow amateur golfers to 
enter into agreements with professional agents, provided that 
the contract or agreement is solely in relation to the golfer’s 
future as a professional golfer and does not stipulate playing 
in certain . . . events as an amateur golfer, and 
. . . the amateur golfer does not obtain payment, compensation 
or any financial gain, directly or indirectly, whilst still an 
amateur golfer.195 
Further, the Rules state that “[a]n amateur golfer may enquire as to his 
likely prospects as a professional golfer, including applying unsuccessfully for 
the position of a professional golfer . . . .”196  Finally, provided that the golfer, 
in writing and before playing, waives all rights to any prize money, an amateur 
golfer may—without risking amateur status—enter and compete in any 
qualifying competitions required to be eligible for membership of a 
professional tour.197 
 
190. 2013 IIHF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER REGULATIONS § II (2012). 
191. AIBA OPEN BOXING COMPETITION RULES § 2.3.2 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
192. The R&A, RANDA.ORG, http://www.randa.org/en/RandA.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
193. R&A, RULES OF GOLF AND THE RULES OF AMATEUR STATUS 2012–2015 r. 6-1 (32nd ed. 
2011) [hereinafter RULES OF GOLF AND THE RULES OF AMATEUR STATUS 2012–2015] (emphasis 
omitted). 
194. Id. r. 3-1 (emphasis omitted). 
195. Id. r. 2-2(b) (emphasis omitted). 
196. Id. r. 2-1, n.1 (emphasis omitted). 
197. Id. r. 2-1, n.2. 
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2.  The Olympic Games 
Jim Thorpe, winning two gold medals in the 1912 Olympics, was stripped 
of his medals because he in the summer of 1910 had played semi-professional 
baseball for $2.00 a game.198  In 1955, Avery Brundage, President of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), expressed his firm support for 
amateurism: “We can only rely on the support of those who believe in the 
principles of fair play and sportsmanship embodied in the amateur code in our 
efforts to prevent the Games from being used by individuals, organizations or 
nations for ulterior motives.”199  But it was widely suspected that many 
Olympic athletes were in fact professionals, supported by their governments to 
train and compete.200  By the end of the 1980s, the movement away from 
amateurism had gained substantial support201 and, in 1991, the IOC eliminated 
the requirement that all participating athletes of the Olympic Games must be 
amateurs.202 
Opening the door for professional athletes had no adverse effect on 
interest in the Olympic Games; rather, it turned the Games into a multi-billion 
dollar enterprise.203  Between 1988 and 2010, the broadcasting revenue 
generated by the games increased from $402.6 million to $1.74 billion for the 
summer games, and from $324.9 million to $1.28 billion for the winter 
games.204  In addition, the overall revenue generated by the various Olympic 
programs increased from a total of $2.63 billion in 1993–1996 to $5.45 billion 
in 2005–2008.205  By departing from its long-held strict view on amateurism, 
 
198. Earl Gustkey, Bones of Contention: Children of Jim Thorpe Want Namesake Town in 
Pennsylvania to Return Their Father’s Remains for Indian Burial in Oklahoma, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/16/sports/sp-26220.  The medals were reinstated in 
1983—30 years after Thorpe’s death.  Id. 
199. Bob Greene, What Changed the Olympics Forever, CNN.COM (July 23, 2012), http://www. 
cnn.com/2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympics-amateurs. 
200. Id.  Other Olympians were paid under the table.  Jeré Longman, Juan Antonio Samaranch, 
Who Transformed the Olympics, Dies at 89, NYTIMES.COM (April 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/04/22/sports/22samaranch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
201. Greene, supra note 199. 
202. Compare OLYMPIC CHARTER 44 (1990) (“All competitors . . . may participate in the 
Olympic Games, except those who have . . . been registered as professional athletes or professional 
coaches in any sport[,] . . . signed a contract as a professional athlete or professional coach in any 
sport before the official closing of the Olympic Games[,] . . . [or] accepted . . . material advantages for 
their preparation or participation in sports competition . . . .”), with OLYMPIC CHARTER 44 (1991) 
(leaving it to each international sports association to establish its own criteria for eligibility, as long as 
such criteria conforms to the Olympic Charter). 
203. Longman, supra note 200. 
204. INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE 26 (2012), 
205. Id. at 6. 
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the Games have increased in popularity while reducing the very problem 
currently faced by student-athletes with regard to lack of choice and 
potentially career-destroying injuries before profitability.206 
IV.  DESIGNING A SOLUTION: BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
While the federal and state governments and the NCAA may state similar 
goals with regard to protecting student-athletes, the existing legislation and 
regulations do more harm than good.207  Government regulations focus on 
protecting educational institutions.208  Meanwhile, the NCAA appears 
primarily concerned with protecting its financial stronghold through its 
concept of amateurism,209 ironically creating the very situation that requires 
government involvement to provide remedies for the educational 
institutions.210  And because each body has its own set of regulations 
pertaining to the agent-athlete relationship,211 these complicate the problem 
instead of solving it and do little to actually protect student-athletes.212 
A.  Draw a Consistent Line Between “Amateur” and “Professional” 
A bright line between “amateur” and “professional” is accepted 
worldwide, but not by the NCAA.213  NCAA’s own regulations make it clear 
 
206. See generally INTERIM REPORT TO THE 114TH IOC SESSION, OLYMPIC GAMES STUDY 
COMMISSION 2 (Nov. 2002) (“The Olympic Games, particularly over the last 20 years, have 
experienced unparalleled growth and universal popularity. . . . Olympic spectators and cumulative 
television audiences for the Summer Games have increased 112% and 117% respectively in the 
twelve years from Seoul in 1988.”); see also Adam Taylor, Here’s How Much Olympic Athletes 
Really Get Paid, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-
olympic-athletes-really-get-paid-2012-7 (noting that while the IOC does not pay the Olympic athletes, 
successful Olympians may reap revenue from various sources). 
207. See Payne, supra note 18, at 691. 
208. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra Parts II.A.–B. 
210. See supra Part II.C.2. 
211. See supra Part III.A. 
212. Payne, supra note 18, at 691–92.  On September 21, 2013, several NCAA football players 
had the letter combination “APU” (All Players United) written on their gear during their games to 
advocate for NCAA reform.  Associated Press, All Players United: College Football Players Show 
Solidarity with Letters ‘APU,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/09/21/all-players-united-ncaa-college-football-players-apu_n_3968876.html?view=screen.  The 
campaign was launched by the National College Players Association, a student-athlete advocacy 
group founded by former UCLA football player Ramogi Huma with the goal of uniting student-
athletes to push for improved conditions.  Id.  An in-depth analysis of the player movement is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. 
213. Compare AIBA OPEN BOXING COMPETITION RULES, supra note 191, and 2013 
INTERNATIONAL IIHF TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 190, and FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE 
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that being drafted is not the same as giving up amateur status.214  Nothing 
supports the conclusion that a football player who declares himself available 
for the draft is less of an amateur than a baseball player actually drafted—or a 
golfer who plays in a professional competition but waives any prize money.215  
By adding the prohibitions regarding drafts and agents,216 the NCAA has 
created arbitrary inconsistencies between sports.  Instead, the NCAA should 
redraw the bright line between “amateur” and “professional” at entering into 
an agreement with or receiving benefits from a professional team,217 not when 
a player is drafted, enters into a draft, or signs with an agent.218  The biggest 
athletic event in the world, the Olympic Games, departed from strict amateur 
restrictions only to see the Games grow even more popular.219  The NCAA 
does not even have to take it that far; it only has to remove its arbitrary 
restraints that do not protect its principle of amateurism. 
B.  Let Student-Athletes into the Professional Leagues 
The professional leagues, such as the NFL, should change their rules to 
allow student-athletes to sign with professional teams.  Despite not satisfying 
the current eligibility requirements to actually play in the NFL, promising 
 
STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS, supra note 189, and RULES OF GOLF AND THE RULES OF 
AMATEUR STATUS 2012–2015, supra note 193, with NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2.  See 
also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art 12.02.8(a) (“A professional team is any organized team 
that . . . [p]rovides any of its players more than actual and necessary expenses for participation on the 
team, except as otherwise permitted by NCAA legislation.”).  Before its 2013 amendments, the 
NCAA bylaws defined a professional athlete as an “athlete . . . who receives any kind of payment, 
directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing legislation of the 
Association.”  2008–09 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.02.3.  This definition was omitted in the 
2013 version, but a student-athlete still loses his or her amateur status for various reasons unrelated to 
payment and, consequently, must gain either professional or some intermediate status that, at best, 
blurs the line between “amateur” and “professional.”  See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2; 
see also Christian Dennie, Changing the Game: The Litigation That May Be the Catalyst for Change 
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 49–50 (2012) (“By and through the evolution 
of intercollegiate athletics, student-athletes as a class fall somewhere between a professional athlete 
and an amateur, i.e., someone competing as an avocation.”). 
214. See supra Part III.A. 
215. See Infante, supra note 128. 
216. See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 36 (C.P.) 
(vacated pursuant to settlement). 
217. As a starting point, any team that, including through a third party, provides payment beyond 
necessary expenses for athletic abilities would have to be considered a “professional team.”  See 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.02.4. 
218. The NCAA has already drawn this line.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2(c)–(e).  
But see id. art. 12.1.2(f)–(g) (eliminating a student-athlete’s eligibility for entering a professional draft 
or entering into an agreement with an agent). 
219. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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student-athletes could benefit from having the opportunity to choose to make 
the move to professional sports, train with professional athletes under the 
supervision of professional coaches, and make some money while doing 
so220—without risk of losing market leverage or suffering a career-ending 
injury in college.221 
C.  The Missing Party: The Professional Sports Team 
Without professional sports, there would be no professional athletes, and 
consequently, an amateur player would never risk losing his or her amateur 
status.  Current legislation and regulations focus on the student-athlete, its 
institution, and any athlete agent who represents the student-athlete—
representation that would be irrelevant if the student-athlete does not intend to 
go professional or otherwise profit from his or her sport.  But they largely 
ignore the fact that without the professional team, the student-athlete can never 
become a professional athlete.  Rather, student-athletes risk finding themselves 
in a gray zone in which they are neither amateurs nor professionals.222  For 
any legislation to be truly effective, it must not only consider but also directly 
include the professional teams.223 
D.  Checks-and-Balances: Duties and Consequences of Breach 
The student-athletes, agents, institutions, and professional teams all need 
to be regulated and protected from each other.224  With the focus of the 
legislative restrictions on institutions and agents, student-athletes are not afraid 
to abuse the system, i.e., by entering into contracts they know the agent will 
not be able to enforce under the UAAA or by accepting benefits from an agent 
who has more to lose than the player.225  The legislation currently in place is 
unbalanced and imposes upon student-athletes and agents disproportionate 
restrictions and unrealistic consequences226 for violations but fails to similarly 
 
220. See NFL CBA, supra note 55, art. 33, § 1(a) (allowing NFL teams to maintain a practice 
squad). 
221. See Travis, supra note 2. 
222. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
223. Several scholars have expressed concern over the fact that UAAA and SPARTA do not 
sufficiently regulate the agent-professional player relationship, and others have suggested that 
professional teams must educate student-athletes.  See Glenn M. Wong et al., Going Pro in Sports: 
Providing Guidance to Student-Athletes in a Complicated Legal & Regulatory Environment, 28 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 553, 605–06 (2011).  That discussion is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
224. See supra Parts II.C, III. 
225. See United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993). 
226. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.A. 
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impose responsibilities on the professional teams.227 
Student-athletes and agents already have a duty to report any 
communication between them to the student-athlete’s educational 
institution.228  The purpose of this requirement is to protect the institutions 
from unknowingly violating NCAA regulations and the often severe 
consequences for doing so.229  But the purpose can be even better served if the 
NCAA amends its definition of “amateur” to allow the student-athletes to 
retain their amateur status without risking their eligibility until they actually 
sign with a professional team,230 accompanied by a parallel amendment to the 
legislation that requires every professional team to inform a student-athlete’s 
institution about the contact with a student-athlete before entering into any 
form of negotiation of a contract or providing any form of benefit.231  The 
institution will then be responsible to communicate with the NCAA and 
ultimately make sure that no NCAA violations take place, a duty that fits well 
within the already severe scheme of regulations imposed on the institutions for 
violations.232 
Placing this responsibility on the professional team makes sense because 
they can easily satisfy the duty by contacting the institution and—as in many 
cases, such as those involving the NBA and the NFL—the professional league 
has restrictions in place to prevent promising athletes from going professional 
until certain minimum conditions are satisfied, while exposing promising 
athletes like Johnny Manziel and Tyrone Prothro to a prolonged risk of being 
injured in college and missed opportunities to capitalize on their success.233  
Under this approach, NCAA would still be able to sanction an NCAA 
institution for playing a student-athlete who has entered into negotiations with 
or received benefits from a professional team regardless of whether the 
institution received notice from the professional team.234 
 
227. See Sports Agency Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) 15 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012); 
UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 11 (2000). 
228. See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 11. 
229. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.9.5–19.9.7; see also Reggie Bush to Forfeit 
Heisman, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5572827 (last updated 
Sept. 15, 2010) (describing the severe sanctions the NCAA passed down on USC after Reggie Bush 
had accepted improper benefits while playing for the institution). 
230. See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶¶ 38–41 
(C.P.) (vacated pursuant to settlement). 
231. Such duty can be modeled after current SPARTA notice obligations for student-athletes and 
agents.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7805(a). 
232. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 19.9.5–19.9.8. 
233. See Associated Press, Ex-Sooner’s Knees Won’t Let Him Play, supra note 184. 
234. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 12.1.2 (loss of amateur status and, consequently, 
eligibility); id. art. 14.01.1 (“An institution shall not permit a student-athlete to represent it in 
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But while the risk of NCAA sanctions remains, the codification of 
applicable negligence standards could cause the financial consequences to 
differ significantly.  In Texas, for example, negligence consists of three 
elements: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of that legal duty; and (3) damages 
proximately caused by that breach.235 
Codifying the professional team’s duty to communicate any student-
athlete contact to the student-athlete’s educational institution establishes the 
first element.  If the professional team fails to properly communicate with the 
institution, it satisfies the second element.  And if the unknowing institution 
plays the student-athlete and consequently is subject to NCAA sanctions, 
damages resulting from the breach, and the institution can recover its financial 
losses from the professional team.236  Of course, this cause of action rests on 
the premise that the institution did not receive reliable information regarding 
the student-athlete’s potential eligibility issue from any other source, including 
the student-athlete and the agent, because such notice would negate the 
causation element.237  However, the simultaneous failure of the agent and the 
student-athlete to communicate the professional negotiations to the institution 
should not be considered an independent cause that relieves the professional 
team from liability.238  Rather, considering the agent and student-athlete’s 
failure to provide adequate information to the institution foreseeable by the 
professional team would render such failure irrelevant in determining the 
team’s potential liability.239 
 
intercollegiate athletics competition unless the student-athlete meets all applicable eligibility 
requirements, and the institution has certified the student-athlete’s eligibility.”); id. art. 19.9.5–19.9.8 
(NCAA may penalize institutions for playing ineligible student-athletes). 
235. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990) (“The plaintiff 
must establish both the existence and the violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant to 
establish liability in tort.  Moreover, the existence of duty is a question of law for the court to decide 
from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question.” (citation omitted)). 
236. The professional team can likely afford to indemnify the institution.  See Sports Industry 
Overview, supra note 50 and accompanying text.  Besides, all the professional team would have to do 
to avoid facing liability is to provide notice to the institution before providing any benefit to, or 
entering into negotiations with, the athlete. 
237. See Lesieur v. Fryar, 325 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App. 2010) (holding that “despite the 
slight variations in the technical terminology used by the two inspectors in the reports, the 
information provided . . . afforded [Lesieur] the same level of warning . . .”). 
238. See Dew v. Crown Derrick Erectors, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. 2006) (“A new and 
independent cause is one that intervenes between the original wrong and the final injury such that the 
injury is attributed to the new cause rather than the first and more remote cause.”). 
239. Id. at 451 (quoting SALES AND EDGAR § 1.04[4][b] at 1–55 (“‘Generally speaking, if the 
intervening force was foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligence, the force is considered to 
be a ‘concurring cause’ of the plaintiff's injuries,’ and ‘the defendant remains liable for the original 
negligence.’”)); see also J. Wigglesworth Co. v. Peeples, 985 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[I]f an intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant in the exercise of ordinary 
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Tasking professional teams with the duty to report contact with student-
athletes to their institutions does not mean relieving the student-athlete or any 
agent of the student athlete of the same duty.240  An agent who fails to provide 
notice should face a fine or suspension and, repeated violations should cause 
the agent to be stripped of the right to represent athletes in any capacity.241  A 
student-athlete in violation of these rules should face consequences particular 
to the student-athlete’s situation, such as suspension from playing at the 
professional level,242 based on the premise that an athlete does not become 
professional until having received a benefit or entered into a contract with a 
professional team.243  And if a student-athlete’s conduct causes the unknowing 
represented institution to suffer negative consequences, it is only fair to not 
allow the student-athlete to benefit therefrom—by affecting his or her 
eligibility to play professionally.244 
A system with this structure would not only equitably distribute the 
responsibility between the major parties involved in a student-athlete’s 
transition from collegiate to professional sports but also place reasonable 
consequences of violations with each party based on the particular party’s 
interests and ability to perform.245 
Of course, for this system to work well, the NCAA must recognize that 
hiring agents is clearly distinguishable from receiving benefits for athletic 
abilities,246 and the professional leagues must be willing to at least allow 
student-athletes to sign on a practice-squad basis.247  The rules that are in 
place to protect Johnny Manziel248 allow him to trademark “Johnny 
 
care, it cannot be considered a new and independent cause”). 
240. See Sports Agency Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), 15 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
241. See Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 551, 581–82 (2011); see also Willenbacher, supra note 74, at 1250 (suggesting that agents 
should risk being stripped of their right to represent athletes and lose the right to contracts already 
entered in to with athletes). 
242. See Glenn M. Wong et al., supra note 223, at 606. 
243. See Moore, supra note 13, at 555. 
244. Id. at 554–55.  This is intended only as a worst-case scenario and should not be interpreted 
to mean that any student-athlete found in violation of any NCAA rule causing negative consequences 
to the represented institution should lose the chance to play professionally. 
245. See supra Parts II.C.2, III.A. 
246. See Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 17, 2009-Ohio-6587, 920 N.E.2d 203, ¶¶ 38–41 
(C.P.) (vacated pursuant to settlement). 
247. See NFL CBA, supra note 55, art. 33, § 1(a). 
248. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 369 F.3d 124, 125–26 
(2nd Cir. 2004); see also National Football League Eligibility Rules, supra note 52; NCAA MANUAL, 
supra note 15, art. 12.1.2(f). 
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Football”249 but restrict him from entering the draft.  Tyrone Prothro was a 
college star with an extremely bright future.250  A gruesome injury, exactly 
what the NFL states that it wants to protect the young players from, cost him 
his chance to play professionally, and all he did was play by the rules that 
were supposed to protect him.251 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The NCAA must acknowledge that its arbitrary line between “amateur” 
and “professional” does little but protect its own moneymaking machine.  A 
bright line should be drawn in the only place where it makes sense: an athlete 
does not become professional until he or she signs a professional contract or 
receives such benefits.  The professional leagues must open their doors for 
athletes to actually sign with the teams, even if they are not eligible to actually 
play in the league yet.  Each major party involved in a student-athlete’s 
transition from college to professional sports—the athlete, the agent, the 
NCAA institution, and the professional team—must all take on the appropriate 
duty and face proportionate consequences for any violations.  Strict 
restrictions on the agents alone work only as a Band-Aid to cover the 
underlying issue: a system skewed heavily in favor of the NCAA and its 
member institutions.  A proper checks-and-balances system holds everyone 
accountable but also offers appropriate protection. 
The regulatory scheme should not focus on severely punishing those who 
violate the rules but rather helping the involved parties to abide by them.  By 
placing appropriate duties on each party involved—including the professional 
teams—severe sanctions would only fall on those truly deserving punishment.  
Along with a bright line between the NCAA definitions of “amateur” and 
“professional,” this system would provide incentives for all of the involved 
parties to play by the rules, making enforcement much easier and giving 
Johnny Football and his fellow student-athletes a better position from which to 
make a decision based on what is best for them individually—and not for the 
NCAA or the professional teams. 
 
249. Rovell, Nickname Infringement, supra note 171. 
250. See Travis, supra note 2. 
251. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 1.2–1.3, 2.9. 
